FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS/CRITICAL ITEMS L.

FMEA NUMBER: CSD-TB-12A

ORIGINATOR: JSC

PROJECT: GFE Orbitet

PART NAME: 0/O INST. WIF

PART NUMBER: SE039126489-301

LSC CONTROL NO: N/A ZONE/LOCATION: CABIN/PLB LRU/ORU PART NUMBER:SED39126212-301 QUANTITY: 1 LRU/ORU PART NAME: TASK BOARD DRAWING/REF DESIGNATOR: SEE P/N

SYSTEM: DTO 671 SUBSYSTEM: EVA EXP.

EFFECTIVITY/AFFECT STAGE: STS-69&SUBS

CRITICALITY:

CRITICAL ITEM? Yes SUCCESS PATHS: 2 CRITICALITY CATEGORY: 1R/2

SUCCESS PATH REMAINING:__1__

END ITEM NAME: N/A

END ITEM FUNCTIONAL: N/A END ITEM CAPABILITY: N/A

END ITEM FAILURE TOLERANCE: N/A

REDUNDANCY SCREENS:

A/1. C/O PRELAUNCH Pass

C/O ON ORBIT: N/A

B/3. DETECTION FLIGHT CREW: N/A

DETECTION GROUND CREW:N/A

C/5. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY FROM SINGLE CAUSE: Pass

ON-ORBIT RESTORABILITY: N/A

FUNCTION: The on orbit installed WIF interfaces with its adapter plate mounted on the task board. For the DTO, the on orbit installation features will be evaluated. Two spring loaded shear pins will drop into holes on the mounting plate located on the task board to secure the device. A EVA release is incorporated to facilitate multiple evaluations. The on orbit installed WIF will remain attached to the toolboard after EVA operations are completed.

FAILURE MODE CODE: N/A

FAILURE MODE: Inadvertent release of WIF.

CAUSE: contamination galling, piece part defect

REMAINING PATHS: 2nd pin

EFFECT/ MISSION PHASE: on orbit ops.

CORRECTIVE ACTION: None required.

-FAILURE EFFECTS-

END ITEM/LRU/ORU/ASSEMBLY: One of the two spring loaded pins comes out of hole in mounting

SUBSYSTEM/NEXT ASSEMBLY/INTERFACE: N/A

SYSTEM/END ITEM/MISSION: None.

CREW/VEHICLE: None, for single failure. Second spring loaded pin will restrain WIF for landing. Possible impact damage to vehicle if both pins float out of holes in the adapter plate and WIF slides of wedge on mounting plate.

FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS/CRITICAL ITEMS LIS

PROJECT: GFE Orbiter ORIGINATOR: JSC MEA NUMBER: CSD-TB-12A LRU/ORU PART NUMBER:SED39126212-301 QUANTITY: 1 ART NAME: O/O INST. WIF SYSTEM: DTO 671 LRU/ORU PART NAME: TASK BOARD PART NUMBER: SED39126489-301 SUBSYSTEM: EVA EXP. DRAWING/REF DESIGNATOR: SEE P/N LSC CONTROL NO: N/A EFFECTIVITY/AFFECT STAGE: STS-69&SUBS ZONE/LOCATION: CABIN/PLB HAZARD INFORMATION: HAZARD: YES_x__ NO___ HAZARD ORGANIZATION CODE: N/A HAZARD NUMBER: N/A TIME TO EFFECT: Seconds TIME TO DETECT:N/A TIME TO CORRECT: Immediate FAILURE DETECTION/FLIGHT - None during landing. REMARKS: -RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTABILITY-

The On Orbit Installed Worksite Interface incorporates 2 spring loaded pins and a dovetail shape sliding receptable which restrain the item to the task board. Locked status indication is provided by windows on the WIF housing which provide a visual indication of each pins position.

· (B) TEST:

Acceptance:

- 1) Functional: Verified at Predelivery Acceptance Test, Preinstallation acceptance, and Pre/Post environmental test. Minimum of 30 actuation cycles
 - a) Force to install and remove the on-orbit install WIF to and from it's mounting plate shall between 3.5 and 8 lb per TPS.

Oualification:

Environmental:

Thermal: Functional verification performed at -100°F and + 200°F. Additionally a functional test was performed where a temperature difference of a minimum of 100 °F existed between the mounting plate and the WIF.

Vibration: A vibration test of the WIF was done during the integrated Task board Assy. test to the following levels. Duration of the test was I minute per axis.

X 3xis 26 80 Hz +3.0 db/oct 80 : 350 Hz 0.040 g ² /Hz 350 to 2000 Hz -3.0 db/oct	Y axis 20 to 45 Hz +10.0 db/oct 45 to 600Hz 0.060 g ² /Hz 600 to 2000 Hz -6.0 db/oct	Z axis 20 to 45 HZ
Overall = 6.1 grms	Overall = 7.7 grms	4

FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS/CRITICAL ITEMS LIS

FMEA NUMBER: CSD-TB-12A ORIGINATOR: JSC. PROJECT: GFE Orbiter

PART NAME:O/O INST. WIF PART NUMBER: SED39126489-301 LSC CONTROL NO: N/A

LRU/ORU PART NAME: TASK BOARD DRAWING/REF DESIGNATOR: SEE P/N

LRU/ORU PART NUMBER:SED39126212-301 QUANTITY: 1 SYSTEM: DTO 671 SUBSYSTEM: EVA EXP.

ZONE/LOCATION: CABIN/PLB EFFECTIVITY/AFFECT STAGE: STS-69&SUBS

(C) INSPECTION:

Fabrication - All task board components are verified to be built to print and generally clean individually. The task board assy, is verified to be visually clean at predelivery acceptance. Test - Quality Assurance surveillance is required at all test and inspections. Discrepancy reports are written on all noncompliance's.

FAILURE HISTORY: None. (D)

OPERATIONAL USE:

- 1) Operational Effect -Unsecured On-Orbit Installed WIF on task board.
- Crew Action None
- 3) Crew Training Crew trained in proper operation of mounting the On-Orbit Installed WIF and verifying that the pins are in the locked position at the end of operations with the WIF.
- 4) Mission constraint None.
- 5) In Flight Checkout Proper function of on orbit installed WIF mounting verified during EVA operations.

(F) MAINTAINABILITY: N/A

PREPARED BY: G.Wright REVISION:

DATE: 04/15/95 WAIVER NUMBER